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Abstract 
A new urban consolidation centre, called Binnenstadservice.nl (‘Inner city service’), started business in April 2008 in the Dutch 
city of Nijmegen. The consolidation centre in Nijmegen differs from initiatives in the past, distinguishing itself from other UCC 
initiatives by its focus on receivers rather than on carriers. After one year already 98 stores joined Binnenstadservice.nl and this 
number is still growing. Due to Binnenstadservice.nl, fewer trucks enter the city centre and fewer kilometres are driven. In this 
paper we provide insights into the local effects of the Binnenstadservice pilot after one year, such as air quality, inconvenience 
for residents and noise nuisance. The effects on local air quality and noise nuisance are limited, due to the amount of passenger 
and bus traffic remaining. Plans exist to start Binnenstadservice.nl franchises in other Dutch cities, which could result in making 
Binnenstadservice.nl a more serious partner for carriers to handle the transport of last mile distribution in cities. 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
Urban consolidation centre initiatives frequently appear in city logistics. Many of these initiatives needed huge 
government subsidies to be operational in practice. For example, authorities tried to implement a city consolidation 
centre several times over the last two decades, but without success (see for example Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 1995; Schoemaker, 2002; Van der Poel, 2000). In spite of these not really hopeful examples, a new 
urban consolidation centre, called Binnenstadservice.nl (‘Inner city service’), started business in April 2008 in the 
Dutch city of Nijmegen. In this paper we examine this initiative. First, we discuss the lessons from earlier city 
consolidation centre initiatives. Next, we explain the ideas and concepts that form the base for Binnenstadervice.nl 
(BSS) in Nijmegen and show how some of the past failures are dealt with in this concept. The paper then continues 
with the methodology used to examine the impacts of BSS on the city of Nijmegen after having been operational for 
one year. We also examine the local impacts of three potential growth-scenarios for BSS. This paper ends with some 
conclusions. 
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2. Urban Consolidation Centres 
Urban consolidation centres include all initiatives that use a facility, in which flows from outside the city are 
consolidated with the objective to bundle inner-city transportation activities. In this section we evaluate urban 
consolidation centre initiatives based on Quak (2008). City consolidation centres are not new; consolidation centre 
initiatives were already examined in the seventies. For example, McDermott (1975) discusses the potential benefits 
and disadvantages of operating an urban consolidation terminal for carriers, shippers, consumers, society and 
authorities. 
The idea of city consolidation centre initiatives is to separate the distribution activities in activities inside the city 
and outside the city. Transhipping at the city border makes it possible to benefit from the advantages of large 
vehicles for long haul transport outside the city without having the disadvantages in the urban area, such as pollution, 
inconvenience and traffic safety risks. After transhipment at a consolidation centre, smaller trucks transport the 
goods to outlets in the city. An extra advantage is that the small trucks can be fully loaded in the consolidation 
centre, which results in a minimum number of vehicles entering the city. However, it might take more small vehicles 
to replace the large vehicles, which could increase the number of vehicles in the city.  
Many store deliveries are already consolidated in some form, but this is often not the most optimal from a city 
perspective. The majority of stores in urban areas in The Netherlands are part of retail chains. Especially in the 
bigger Dutch cities’ shopping centre and the core shopping centres in middle sized cities, the percentages of stores 
that belong to a retail chain run up to 75%, measured in sales floor area and number of outlets (see EIM, 2004). 
These chains organize their store deliveries from a retail distribution centre (DC). At the retail DC, the retail chain 
consolidates deliveries from several suppliers. Next, the retail chain plans efficient roundtrips with store-deliveries 
from the retail DC. In these centres a form of combining in space takes place. This form of combining might be 
most cost-efficient for the retail chains; it is usually not so from a city perspective. Retail chains optimize their 
deliveries from an origin-perspective (i.e. the retail distribution centre), while for cities optimization from a 
destination-perspective would be best.  
Retailers’ efficiency is under pressure in the Netherlands due to increasing local authorities’ regulations, such as 
time-windows, environmental zones and vehicle restrictions (see Quak and De Koster, 2007; 2009). Although 
consolidation is possible (in both a retail distribution centre and a city consolidation centre) the concept is 
considerably different. The origin-combining of urban-store deliveries is common practice. Only one actor, the retail 
chain, is responsible for organizing this form of consolidation and also profits from it. The destination-combining 
per city is not practiced on large scale. It is more difficult to organize as well, since it requires cooperation between 
several actors and it is not always clear who benefits financially. 
In spite of the many positive impacts for carriers, i.e. no longer inefficient operations in cities, and for cities 
found in many studies, only a few urban consolidation centre initiatives have been realized in practice that did not 
terminate after a few years (Quak, 2008). This corresponds to the findings Browne et al. (2005) report in their 
extensive literature review on urban consolidation centre schemes. 
2.1. Examples of urban consolidation centre 
One of the best-known implemented consolidation centre initiatives is the one in Monaco (see e.g. Patier, 2006; 
Van Binsbergen and Visser, 2001). The Monaco government initiated it in 1989 in combination with strict truck 
regulations and the provision of huge subsidies. As a result, the governmental subsidy per delivery did exceed the 
price customers pay per delivery. Monaco’s typical characteristics add to the initiative’s success, but make the 
results hardly transferable to other cities. Monaco, in addition to a city is also a sovereign state, which enables the 
complete insertion of the Urban Consolidation Centre (UCC) concept in Monaco’s global policy. Besides, the 
government has a comfortable financial position, which makes huge financial support possible. Another 
implemented UCC initiative comes from La Rochelle (Patier, 2006). An UCC was set up in 2001 with a 
considerable starting subsidy. From the UCC, electric vehicles supply the historical city centre of La Rochelle. 
Some problems occurred in the initiative, i.e. although regulation forbids heavy vehicles to enter, the enforcement is 
lacking. Next, the capacity of the electric vehicle was limited, resulting in more vehicle trips and an increase in 
urban congestion. Furthermore, it turned out to be legally not allowed to deny access for non-UCC users, as long as 
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they satisfy the vehicle restrictions and time-windows. And finally, no one responded to the tendering for the UCC 
management.  
A comparable initiative failed in Leiden (Schoemaker, 2002). The urban consolidation centre opened in 1997 to 
improve the quality of life in the historical centre of Leiden (see also Van der Poel, 2000). Eventually, the number of 
customers for Leiden’s UCC was by no means sufficient to reach the break-even volume, even after the surrounding 
cities were added to the working area of the UCC. Parcel delivery companies decided not to join the initiative, 
basically because they were not willing to collaborate with their competitors. The project stopped in 2000. 
Schoemaker (2002) mentions some failure factors for the project, i.e.: 
 
x The UCC was located too far away from the highway and from the city centre, 
x The supporting policy measures, i.e. time-windows and vehicle restrictions, resulted in opposition against the 
UCC. These measures were considered to be unfair ways to keep the municipality’s unprofitable UCC alive, 
instead of making the city more attractive, 
x Reluctance in the transport industry to use the UCC; e.g. already thin margins on transport, for complex goods 
using the UCC was legally not allowed and insurance companies did not allow valuable goods to be transhipped 
through the UCC, 
x Electric vehicles slowed down all traffic,  
x More city distribution centres were started; companies could start their own UCC if they fulfilled some 
regulations and as a result received the same advantages as the municipality’s UCC, and 
x Financially not feasible due to lack of volume. 
 
After some initial successes, many German cooperation and city distribution centre initiatives were terminated 
after the first phase or even earlier. Browne et al. (2005) found that of the approximately 200 planned or realised 
schemes in Germany at most five were actually operating in 2005. In search for cooperation and city distribution 
centre initiative’s success factors, Koehler (2004) found two successful initiatives that had a freight traffic centre 
incorporated: Nürnberg city logistics initiative, Isolde, and Regensburg city logistics project, Reglog. These 
initiatives have the following success factors in common (Koehler, 2004): restricted traffic conditions in the cities, 
mediator, scientific support in initial phase, integration of a freight traffic centre in the initiative, enforcement of 
regulations by local authorities, early involvement of all actors and collection of waste to utilise vehicles better by 
including the loads for the return trips to the freight centre. 
2.2. Lessons from the previous initiatives and studies 
In addition to these examples of actually implemented city consolidation centres, a large number of studies show 
that there are, theoretically at least, huge advantages in cases where such centres were used. However, initiatives 
failed to answer the question which trucking companies would be interested in using urban freight facilities. Usually, 
the carrier-willingness to cooperate in an urban consolidation centre is high at the start of an initiative and the fact 
that deliveries are already efficiently organized from a carrier-perspective is neglected. A problem in practice is that 
the number of participating carriers is usually far lower than expected, which implies less scale advantages and less 
bundling possibilities resulting in higher cost per delivery. Ambrosini et al. (2004) and Regan and Golob (2005) 
estimate that about 20% of the carriers are willing to use a city consolidation centre.  
These results correspond to findings of Browne et al. (2005) who state that, “some urban consolidation centre 
trails have been based on intuition rather than a quantified assessment and as a consequence are never likely to be 
viable”. Even if policy restrictions are in place, many carriers still prefer directly supplying the stores, without using 
the urban consolidation centre (see e.g. Patier, 2006; Schoemaker, 2002). Although, local authorities usually aim at 
offering consolidation centres as a means to deal with restricting policies, carriers perceive the regulations as a way 
to force them to use this unprofitable centre, although it raises their costs. Therefore, it is of importance to clearly 
communicate the reasons for the restrictions and the consolidation centre (see e.g. Koehler, 2004; Patier, 2006; Van 
der Poel, 2000).  
Another lesson from the initiatives for authorities is not to be over ambitious; for example in case electric 
vehicles are used for the final deliveries in the city and these vehicles hinder traffic, social acceptance of the 
consolidation centre that uses these vehicles is probably very low (see Schoemaker, 2002; Van der Poel, 2000). Next, 
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it is also important to make the positive results visible for all stakeholders (Koehler, 2004). Consolidation centres 
might not have positive results for all type of deliveries; for example, one FTL delivery for a store in the city centre 
is more efficient than several small vehicles, see also Boerkamps and Van Binsbergen (1999) who argues that food 
retail operations are already very efficient. Many initiatives implicitly aim at LTL deliveries to urban areas. 
However, this focus is not made explicit; a distinction between FTL and LTL deliveries, could prevent an undesired 
side-effect, i.e. if FTL deliveries are also included in consolidation centre initiatives, a decrease in efficiency of 
these deliveries and an increase in the number of vehicles could be the result.  
The initiative might work for LTL deliveries, but turns out to be unsuccessful due to the negative effects for FTL 
deliveries. Especially deliveries with a high frequency, low volume, and that contain simple products are potentially 
interesting for consolidation centre initiatives. Browne et al. (2005) also argue that, from a logistical view, the major 
potential beneficiaries of an UCC are independent and small retailers as well as operators making small multi-drop 
deliveries in especially areas in which constraints on delivery conditions exists (e.g. restricting regulations or 
congestion).  
Finally, the decision on the location(s) can determine success or failure (see also Browne et al., 2005). 
Boerkamps and Van Binsbergen (1999) and Patier (2006) argue for large government subsidies, because of the 
positive environmental impacts. Initiatives that are actually implemented show that subsidies are usually necessary 
to operate these centres. Browne et al. (2005) also conclude based on their review that UCCs have the most potential 
if there is enough external funding, as self-financing UCCs do not occur in practice yet. Another way to compensate 
for these extra costs might be by offering extra services, e.g. pick up points for customers or storage facilities. 
Overall, consolidation centres seem to be most feasible, if feasible at all, for historical cities that have restrictive and 
inhibitive conditions for urban freight transportation anyway, next to potential governmental restrictions.  
We already argued that many urban store deliveries are currently efficiently organized from a retail chain 
perspective, but that this is not the case from a city perspective. However, in many initiatives precisely these retail 
chains are saddled with the extra costs. Carriers, currently responsible for making deliveries in urban areas, are used 
to doing so without a consolidation centre. They have to be convinced about the reason to change the current 
situation in order to give the initiative a chance. Receivers are hardly involved in most of these initiatives. Usually, 
receivers are not aware that they are responsible for the unsustainable transport operations by ordering goods. 
3. A New Type of UDC, the Concept of Binnenstadservice 
Binnenstadservice.nl (BSS) started its services as an urban consolidation centre in April 2008 in the Dutch city of 
Nijmegen. Nijmegen is one of the oldest cities in the Netherlands with over 161,000 inhabitants. The medieval city 
centre is situated on a small hill and has a historical structure with streets where many small, independent retailers 
are located. BSS’s consolidation centre is located about 1.5 kilometres away. The consolidation centre in Nijmegen 
differs from initiatives in the past that have been presented in the previous section. First of all, BSS distinguishes 
itself from other UCC initiatives by its focus on receivers rather than on carriers. Previous initiatives mainly focused 
on carriers and usually these carriers do not profit directly from one urban distribution centre, it is usually the other 
way around. The small and independent retailers do not have to pay for BSS’ basic service, i.e. receiving goods and 
delivering these goods to the store at the time the store-owner likes. The small retail store owner has to take action; 
if a store wants make use of BSS’ services it has to join BSS. The most important activity for the store-owner is then 
to (allow BSS to) send a change of address to its suppliers (i.e. BSS’ address). Then, carriers deliver the goods to 
BSS. BSS deliberately focuses on small and independent retailers, since their deliveries are usually not optimized, in 
contrast to those of retail chains. By bundling the deliveries from multiple suppliers for the store-owner and 
delivering the goods at the time the retailer wishes, BSS offers a service that saves the small store-owners time. Next 
to this basic service, the retailers can purchase extra services at BSS for money:  
 
x Storage (so that retailers no longer have to use their shop to store goods or rent storage space elsewhere), 
x Home-deliveries (for example for large goods, such as fridges and computers), 
x Value-added logistics including retour logistics (of for example clean waste), and 
x Possibilities for e-tailing in the city of Nijmegen. 
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Figure 1 Binnenstadservice’s transport vehicles 
BSS also offers paid services for other receivers that do not have an optimized delivery scheme, such as hotels 
(e.g. collecting and delivering laundry) and deliveries for the local authorities of Nijmegen. BSS only handles 
(relatively) simple products, no conditioned food. By focusing on small retailers, almost all deliveries are small 
deliveries, so no FTL deliveries have to be split up into multiple vehicles. BSS uses clean transportation to deliver 
goods in the city centre in order to reduce the emissions; i.e. an electronic bicycle and a natural gas truck (see Figure 
1). These vehicles do not hinder other traffic.  
The mission of Binnenstadservice.nl is to provide logistical services to local inner city stores, regional consumers, 
carriers and local government. BSS has a location outside the city centre where goods can be received and picked up 
18 hours a day. The objective is to minimise the amount of trips through the city centre. BSS started with only 
twenty clients in April 2008. The number of connected stores increased to 98 after one year. Figure 2 shows that 
next to an increase in the number of connected stores, also the delivered volume increased. 
BSS received a government subsidy for one year to start business in Nijmegen and has had time to build a 
sufficient amount of stores. The intention of the subsidy is to give BSS time to find enough customers. The idea is 
that BSS should be profitable in the future, but this is not the case yet. Since April 2009 it has to operate without 
financial governmental support. Since the basic service to store-owners is free of charge, BSS has to make money by 
offering extra services. Next, BSS also negotiates with carriers. Carriers see that they have to make fewer deliveries 
in the city of Nijmegen, since an increasing number of stores ask to deliver goods to BSS. Some carriers share the 
cost savings with BSS, in case BSS can also persuade the remaining carrier’s clients to join so that they do not have 
to enter the Nijmegen city-centre. For example, normally a carrier had to visit Nijmegen daily, because receivers 
were used to receive goods at different days. In the new situation the carrier delivers to BSS one time and BSS 
makes sure the deliveries are sent to the receivers at the desired day.  
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Figure 2 Increasing number of delivered pallets and boxes 
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BSS receives money from other sources; it (partly) serves as a social workplace, so some staff are (partly) 
subsidized by local authorities. The Nijmegen local authorities are also a paying customer for BSS’s distribution 
activities. Finally, BSS is extending to other cities, so that it becomes an interesting party to do business with for 
national (or regional) operating carriers. The BSS concept for other cities is similar; still only store-owners can join 
the initiative. Carriers do make appointments with BSS’s national organization, called ECO2CITY, about contacting 
their delivery-addresses (stores in the city centre) to join the local BSS initiative. In March 2009 a second BSS 
opened for business in the city of Den Bosch (without subsidy). There are negotiations to start services in more 
cities. More than 18 Dutch cities have shown interest in the concept. BSS uses franchisers to start these new centres. 
Requirements to start are (among other things) that a local entrepreneur with local knowledge and network will start 
as franchisee. 
Carriers could save money by using several BSS consolidation centres, and they only have one contact for using 
the service in multiple cities. The money saved is shared with BSS usually from a corporate social responsibility-
perspective. BSS contacts the local stores, to finalize contracts with the local retailers. In case, the local retailer does 
not want to do business with BSS, BSS does not receive goods of the carriers for this retailer. So, in the agreements 
with the carriers, the local retailers are always the end-client for BSS, and not the carrier. BSS only undertakes 
distribution activities in city centres. This implies it does not make deliveries between different BSS centres. BSS 
claims not to use highways. Therefore, BSS does not compete with carriers, since carriers are always needed for 
delivering goods to the local BSS centres, which increases carrier-willingness to cooperate in BSS initiatives.  
4. Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to provide insights into the local effects of the Binnenstadservice pilot after one year for 
air quality, inconvenience for residents and noise nuisance. We examine the local impacts of urban deliveries for 
one representative day. Not all stores that joined the BSS-initiative receive deliveries on that day (see Table 1). 
Since the emphasis is on local impacts in this paper, the area we study is limited to the Nijmegen city centre (see 
Figure 3). 
4.1. Scenarios 
We examined what were the local effects for the city centre of Nijmegen after one year, as well as for three 
artificial scenarios (see Table 1). The artificial scenarios are evaluated because they represent the planned growth of 
BSS in the second and third year (scenarios 3 and 4). Scenario 2 shows the maximum number of potential clients for 
BSS in Nijmegen. This scenario provides an upper bound to the maximum achievable improvements for local 
effects due to the BSS initiative in Nijmegen. The scenarios, both the empirical and artificial ones, are  distinguished 
by the number of retail stores joining the BSS initiative. Table 1 also shows the main assumptions of the scenarios 
that we consider in the remaining part of this paper. We defined the following scenarios (see Table 1): 
Table 1 Defined scenarios 
Number Scenario name Stores joined BSS Stores joined BSS 
representative day 
0 Base scenario  0 0 
1 1 year scenario 98 78 
2 Maximum potential BSS scenario -artificial 632 369 
3 Planned growth after year 2 scenario-artificial 200 176 
4 Planned growth after year 3 scenario-artificial 300 266 
 
x Base scenario – this is the situation before BSS started its services (before April 2008). In this scenario all 
relevant store-deliveries to the Nijmegen city centre are included based on BCI (2005) updated in this research in 
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2008 by TNO. The truck routes in the city centre and the entry and exit points are estimated based on the license 
plate traffic count of GLV (2007). 
x 1 year scenario – this scenario is the situation on April 1, 2009, when BSS had been active in Nijmegen for one 
year. Based on the data of deliveries to and from BSS the store deliveries have changed in comparison to scenario 
0. Deliveries of stores that do not join BSS are similar to scenario 0. 
x Maximum potential BSS scenario – in this artificial scenario we examine the maximum local impacts of BSS. All 
deliveries smaller than 9 roll container equivalents (RCe) are sent to BSS that delivers to the stores. This implies 
that large deliveries, e.g. FTL deliveries, are not going through the BSS consolidation centre, since this does not 
correspond to the BSS concept. 
x Planned growth after 2 years scenario – in this artificial scenario we examine the potential impacts of BSS at the 
planned growth after 2 years. BSS planned to have 100 stores after 1 year, which was almost realised. In this 
scenario we randomly draw 102 extra stores from the potential BSS clients (deliveries smaller than 9 RCe).  
x Planned growth after 3 years scenario – in this artificial scenario we examine the potential impacts of BSS at the 
planned growth after 3 years. Similar to scenario 3, only in this scenario we drew 202 stores randomly. 
4.2. Data 
Before BSS started operations, the local authorities ordered two large data collection studies to make the urban 
freight transport activities visible, i.e. BCI (2005) and GLV (2007). BCI (2005) contains data on deliveries per store 
in Nijmegen for an average week and the carriers responsible for it. GLV (2007) contains data on the truck 
movements during one representative day in, to and from the city centre of Nijmegen, based on license plate counts. 
These data we used in designing the scenarios (see previous section). Based on these data sources we estimated the 
deliveries to stores in the city of Nijmegen for one week, the routes trucks make in the city centre, the type of trucks 
used to make these trips and the deliveries that are combined in one vehicle roundtrip for scenario 0. Next we 
collected data about the deliveries to the stores that joined BSS from BSS. Also a survey among truck drivers in 
Nijmegen was held, on (among other things) their origin, destination, and deliveries.  
Based on this information we designed scenario 1, by changing the deliveries (in scenario 0) that use BSS and not 
changing the deliveries to stores that do not join the BSS-initiative. Based on scenario 1 we designed three artificial 
scenarios that have already been explained. Next, general data about the city centre of Nijmegen was provided by 
the municipality of Nijmegen or purchased by TNO. This includes traffic data (including passenger transport) and 
geographical data (including the number of residents per household in the city centre). 
4.3. Modelling the local impacts 
To find the local impacts of the distribution activities in Nijmegen we simulated the empirical scenarios (0 and 1) 
and the artificial scenarios (2, 3 and 4) in the vehicle routing problem-module of TNO’s logistical model 
RESPONSE™ to define the routes of the trucks in the city centre of Nijmegen. The output includes the required 
fleet size, travelling time and travelling distance (see for more information on RESPONSE™ Van Rooijen et al, 
2007). The simulations’ outputs were used as input for another TNO-model, i.e. Urban Strategy (Schelling et al., 
2007), that was used to calculate and visualize the local impacts of the delivery activities in Nijmegen. Urban 
Strategy has been used to estimate the sustainability impacts of the changes in distribution patterns due to the use of 
Binnenstadservice in Nijmegen. These impacts include air quality and noise nuisance. 
Urban Strategy, also developed by TNO, consists of a group of different models which interact with each other. 
The traffic model generates the traffic demand and assignment of the traffic based on an all-or-nothing assignment. 
The output consists of intensities per road segments. Based on this output the environmental models can run. The 
models used in this study are the noise model and the air quality model. These environmental models answer to the 
requirements of the Dutch and European legislation for calculating these local effects. The RESPONSE™ output of 
routes for freight delivery has been transformed into intensities per road segment of the routes for this research 
project. RESPONSE™ is used only for the city centre. ‘Artificial depots’ have been located on the entry and exit 
points of the city centre to simulate the routes, based on estimates from the questionnaire and GLV (2007) where 
each truck enters and leaves. These data have been added to the traffic model of the Urban Strategy.  
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Air quality and noise nuisance have been calculated with Urban Strategy according to the Dutch environmental 
legislation. The indicators for air quality are PM10 and NO2. For noise nuisance the LDEN (in dB) value has been 
used. For the results of air quality and noise nuisance the total level of the effects of the BSS traffic together with all 
other traffic has been used. Finally, a new Urban Strategy module has been developed to measure the inconvenience 
for residents. The inconvenience for residents is given by the amount of residents that experience a certain number 
of loading/unloading activities within 100 metres of their home. Normally, the measurement of noise nuisance is 
based on the daily average according to the Dutch environmental legislation (so that different model outcomes are 
comparable). Changes during short periods of the day are not reflected properly due to this method of calculation. 
Therefore, the new indicator reflects the inconvenience caused by freight traffic. Since loading/unloading activities 
are the major source of noise nuisance, these noise effects have been used to take inconvenience more correctly into 
account than the average noise levels over 24 hours. 
5. Results – The Effects of Binnenstadservice 
The results of the study give insights into the local effects on air quality, inconvenience for residents and noise 
nuisance of the Binnenstadservice pilot in Nijmegen after one year. We present similar results for the three artificial 
scenarios (see Table 1). We first present the logistical effects of the different scenarios. 
5.1. Logistical effects 
The logistical results follow from simulation of the different scenarios in RESPONSE™. Table 2 presents the 
logistical results for the five scenarios. The presented indicators apply to the freight transport relevant to BSS in the 
city centre of Nijmegen during one representative day. The relevant freight transport contains only a limited part of 
all large vehicle kilometres in the city centre of Nijmegen. Some store deliveries are not relevant since BSS does not 
focus on these deliveries, e.g. fresh deliveries and full-truckload deliveries. Other large vehicle kilometres are not 
related to store deliveries and are therefore not relevant for BSS. These deliveries include among other things waste 
collection (from homes), money collection and deliveries, service trips, most home deliveries and construction 
related trips. Next, a significant amount of buses (public transport) drive through and in the city centre of Nijmegen. 
To find the logistical effects of BSS we only examined the relevant freight transport, which is approximately 20% of 
all large vehicles counted during one day (see GLV, 2007) excluding the buses. We estimated the other 80% in the 
traffic model to calculate the local effects on air quality and noise, but these traffic movements are not included in 
the logistical model RESPONSE™. The majority of all large vehicle movements in Nijmegen, about 75%, are made 
by van, 22% are made by light freight transport (e.g. light trucks and trucks, see Table 2) and only 3% are made by 
heavy trucks. It is important to note that the results for the logistical effects only apply to a limited part of the traffic 
in the city centre of Nijmegen, i.e. the relevant freight transport since this is modelled in RESPONSE™, whereas all 
other effects are based on all traffic (including remaining large vehicle traffic, passenger traffic and public transport), 
since these effects are modelled in Urban Strategy. 
The differences between scenario 0 and scenario 1 show the actual results after the first year of BSS. Delivering 
to the 98 stores through the BSS’ consolidation centre results in a 5% decrease in the number of truck-kilometres 
and the truck-travel time in the city centre of Nijmegen. The number of truck stops decreases by 7%. This is caused 
by two factors: BSS combines different deliveries from different suppliers for one store in one roundtrip and one 
stop and small deliveries are no longer made by truck, but are carried out by the electronic bicycle (see Figure 1). 
Many of the small retail stores that joined the BSS initiative in the first year receive relatively small deliveries. 
These deliveries are made by own transport of a supplier of the retailer itself or by parcel services. This explains the 
substantial decrease in especially the number of kilometres travelled in the city centre by vans, passenger cars and 
light trucks. The results of BSS after one year are encouraging, but the impacts are relatively small in comparison to 
all freight traffic in the city centre. Therefore, we also consider the other three artificial scenarios, to see what could 
be expected if the growth of the number of stores that join the BSS initiative continues. 
BSS continued business after the one-year pilot without subsidies (although the books are not balanced yet). In 
Nijmegen it showed that this continuation and the extension to other cities already gave some retailers the 
confidence that BSS will survive longer, with the result that they joined the initiative. Table 2 shows that the number 
of kilometres in the city centre decreases at most (scenario 2) with 32% and the travel time in the city centre could 
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decrease by 25%. The number of travelled kilometres decreases substantially if more stores participate in the BSS 
initiative. This is also true for the travel time, the number of trucks, and the number of truck stops in the city centre. 
Table 2 Logistical results for BSS relevant store deliveries in different scenarios in Nijmegen (1 day) 
 Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Number truck-kilometres in city centre  475 451 323 421 382 
Total truck travel time (in hours) 12.9 12.2 9.6 11.7 10.9 
Number of truck routes in city centre  217 208 144 188 166 
Number of truck stops in city centre 486 453 361 424 391 
Number of trucks in city centre  186 182 77 150 125 
Kilometres by van / passenger car (<3.5 tons) 180 141 3 106 62 
Kilometres by light truck (3.5-7 t.)  89 79 29 49 20 
Kilometres by truck (7-18 t.)  190 179 0 153 117 
Kilometres by heavy truck (>18 t.) 15 14 6 8 9 
Kilometres by BSS CNG light truck  0 37 284 105 174 
5.2. Local effects on air quality, noise and inconvenience 
From the logistical results (see Table 2), it is obvious that the decrease in kilometres will result in a decrease in 
emitted pollutant emissions. However, for the local impacts, i.e. the effect of local emissions on the air quality, not 
only the total emitted pollutants are relevant; it is the concentration that really influences the human health. The 
local pollutants’ background concentration (i.e. amount of μg / m3 of PM10 and NO2) is the normal indicator to show 
the local air quality. Since the majority of the large vehicle traffic did not change due to BSS (see first part of 
section 5.1), it is not surprising that Figure 3 shows hardly any difference in concentration for NO2 between the 
scenarios. This result can be explained by the combination of the amount of other remaining traffic (e.g. passenger 
traffic, remaining large vehicle traffic and buses) and the high natural background concentration. Figure 3 at the 
right shows the limited differences. PM10 shows similar results. It is important to notice that air quality does not 
exceed EU regulations in the Nijmegen city centre, not even for scenario 0. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Local air quality - concentration NO2 in scenario 0 (left) and the differences between scenario 2 compared with scenario 0 (right) 
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The amount of other traffic is also the most important variable when determining the noise level. The highest 
noise level is found on the roads across the city centre. Within the city centre the noise is mainly caused by freight 
and public transport. This amount of traffic in the centre is far lower than the amount of transport (including 
passenger transport) on the roads across the centre. The reduction of freight traffic after the first year of BSS and in 
the maximum scenario is too small to show impacts on maps of noise levels. Figure 4 shows the noise level in the 
situation before BSS, which is similar to scenario 1. 
 
 
Figure 4 Noise level in scenario 0 
Table 3 Noise levels (in dB(A)) at locations in the city centre 
Location Scenario 0 Scenario 1  
difference to scenario 0 
Scenario 2 
difference to scenario 0 
Keizer Karelplein (1) 75 0 0 
Grote Markt (2) 63 0 0 
Plein 1944/Broerstraat (3) 48 0 -1 
Marikenstraat (4) 47 0 -1 
Lange Hezelstraat (5) 44 0 +1 
 
To have a closer look on the noise results and to see differences, we measured the noise levels at some specific 
locations in Nijmegen (Table 3, the locations are shown in Figure 4). Passenger traffic and buses cause most of the 
noise at the first two locations in Table 3, which is not influenced by the introduction of BSS. Locations 3 and 4 
(Table 3) are situated in a part of the city centre far away from the BSS entry point. Due to BSS less freight traffic 
drives in this area. Most of these locations have a reduction in noise level of 0.5 to 1 dB(A) in scenario 2. The latter 
location (Table 3) is the shopping street, Lange Hezelstraat, close to the entry point of BSS. A small increase in 
noise level of 1 to 1.5 dB(A) is found here in scenario 2, due to the number of BSS trucks passing through this street 
to deliver to stores in the Nijmegen city centre. The location of BSS’ consolidation centre causes all vehicles to use 
that road (point 6, see Figure 4) to reach to stores in other parts of the city centre. Figure 5 shows the decrease of 
loading/unloading activities at each address in the city centre for the maximum potential BSS scenario. The decrease 
is the strongest in the Lange Hezelstraat (point 6, see Figure 4). In this street most small stores are located and the 
most stores who joined BSS in the first year are located in this street. 
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Figure 5 Decrease in residents inconvenience in city centre (maximum scenario) 
Figure 6 shows that after one year, residents face less inconvenience by urban freight transport due to BSS. 
Figure 6 shows the clear shift towards hindering fewer residents by loading/unloading activities observed in the 
maximum scenario. Figure 6’s Y-axis presents the number of residents that experience inconvenience and the X-axis 
shows the number of loading/unloading activities. Finally, two other local impacts indicators are relevant in city 
logistics initiatives: shopping environment and traffic safety. We did not quantify the impacts for these indicators, 
but they can respectively be related to the number of truck routes and the number of kilometres travelled in the city 
centre. The decrease in number of truck kilometres, truck stops and truck routes in the city centre and the decrease in 
the use of large trucks (see Table 2) indicates that both the shopping environment and traffic safety improve when 
more stores join BSS.  
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Figure 6 Residents inconvenience 
At the moment the concept of BSS continues to grow in Nijmegen (and in the second centre; Den Bosch) as more 
retailers are joining. Besides, entrepreneurs in more Dutch cities have plans to start their own local BSS as a 
franchise-company. More BSS consolidation centres throughout the country have a positive impact on the financial 
stability of the BSS-concept. Due to the national expansion process, new opportunities arise for BSS; BSS becomes 
a more serious partner for transport companies to handle the transport in the last mile distribution in cities. Besides, 
it probably decreases total CO2 emissions, because carriers are able to plan more efficient roundtrips with larger 
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vehicles, since they are not hindered by local authorities’ restrictions such as time-windows and vehicle restrictions 
(see also Quak and De Koster, 2007; 2009). Currently, air quality is a major topic in The Netherlands.  
Several municipalities introduced low emissions zones. The costs for implementing a low emission zone (LEZ) 
are about EUR 225,000 in the Netherlands at the moment (DHV, 2008). For the same amount of money, a BSS 
centre could be subsidized for a couple of years. Although the air quality improvement seems slightly better due to 
LEZ than for BSS; i.e. in absolute numbers for NO2 a LEZ for the Nijmegen city centre would results in a decrease 
of 0.11 µg/m3 (based on DHV, 2008) versus 0.07 µg/m3 due to BSS, which is both relatively very low in 
comparison the background concentration (see Figure 3). Other indicators, such as inconvenience and traffic safety 
remain unchanged due to LEZ, but improve with BSS.  
New start-ups of BSS have plans to deliver the goods with electric vehicles in the city centre. This will be a 
further improvement compared with the CNG truck in Nijmegen. An electric vehicle is a next step in reducing the 
negative local environmental impacts of freight traffic. 
6. Conclusion  
The consolidation centre in Nijmegen differs from consolidation initiatives in the past. BSS distinguishes itself 
from other UCC initiatives by its focus on receivers rather than on carriers. This concept is a success; in its first year 
operating already 98 stores join BSS, which results in an increasing volume. The number of stores and the volume is 
still increasing after BSS decided to continue business after one year, although financially there are still deficits for 
the second year without local authorities’ subsidies.  
BSS already shows positive results after its first year of service in Nijmegen. Due to the BSS consolidation centre, 
the number of trucks and also the number of kilometres in the city centre decreased. In cases where more stores join 
BSS, the reduction in truck kilometres will increase significantly. The effects on inconvenience for residents, traffic 
safety and shopping environment are promising. The effects on local air quality and noise nuisance are limited, due 
to the amount of remaining passenger and bus traffic and the high natural background concentration of PM10 and 
NO2. 
The positive results of BSS in Nijmegen give rise to BSS franchise initiatives in other Dutch cities, i.e. the 
second BSS has already started business in Den Bosch (without subsidy) and at least two new BSS centres are 
planned to open later in 2009. By expanding the BSS concept to other Dutch cities, BSS becomes a more interesting 
partner for carriers, which could result in new revenues for BSS. 
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